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FUTURE AND PAST FUTURE

That two of the tenses included in the system of conjugation of a French verb had their origin in the fusion of the present and imperfect of the verb *avoir* with the infinitive is a fact that has obtained recognition today even in the teaching of elementary grammar. The former of these tenses has been classed from the beginning among the tenses of the indicative, while the latter was assigned in the scheme of conjugation, to a mood of its own, the *conditional*. For a long time it has been, however, a recognized fact that this verb-entity has other uses besides the very frequent and distinctive use in hypothetical sentences. Especially prominent is a "temporal" use, in opposition to the "modal" (conditional, etc.). The temporal use of this verb-entity brings out its very close relationship to the future very clearly; consequently, ever since it was recognized as a distinct tense it was, like the future, assigned to the indicative mood. The recognition of its tense-force brought with it the necessity for giving it a name, and the name "past future" has only very recently in the *Report of the Joint Committee on Grammatical Nomenclature* (July, 1913) received what I may call "official sanction" in America. Mr. Armstrong¹ refers to the name "future of the past" (and "imperfect of the future," of which name, with good reason, he disapproves; [*ibid*]), but the name "past future" is adopted in the recently published treatise on French verbs by Nitze and Wilkins² and there is scarcely a doubt that it is destined to prevail in this country.

The recognition of a specific temporal use of this verbal entity marks a distinct progress in the observation and formulation of the syntax of French moods and tenses; but interesting as it would be, it is beyond the scope of this article to give a history of the introduction into elementary or practical French grammars of the tense-idea of the past future. Some landmarks may, however, be briefly

¹ *Syntax of the French Verb* (1909), p. 43.

² *The French Verb, Its Forms and Uses*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1914.

sketched here. Girault Duvivier seems to make no mention of it in his grammar,¹ and Foth says: "noch Chabaneau in seiner *histoire et théorie de la conjugaison française* erwähnt von einer Bedeutung und Anwendung desselben als eines Futurs der Vergangenheit so gut wie nichts."² No definition of this tense is given by Larousse,³ though some "cautions" relating to this peculiar use of the so-called conditional are given on p. 487. But Ayer says explicitly: "En effet, le conditionnel désigne un avenir au point de vue du passé, comme le future désigne un avenir au point de vue du présent [de la personne qui parle]."⁴ Lücking⁵ clearly defines this tense, though with the not very satisfactory designation of *Imperfekt des Futurs*, and the same designation had been used by Mätzner.⁶

On the whole, in elementary textbooks, even when no specific statement to that effect is made, the assumption appears to be that the past future is a tense of the indicative. Such, indeed, seems to be the prevailing opinion also of those who have devoted special attention to our verb-entity. Clédat says: "C'est donc à l'origine un temps de l'indicatif, et il a conservé cette valeur dans les propositions complétives qui dépendent d'un verbe principal à un temps du passé."⁷ Many years before him, Foth had written: "Vor allen Dingen muss man festhalten, dass es seiner Bildung sowie seiner ursprünglichen Bedeutung und Anwendung nach ein indikativisches Tempus der Vergangenheit ist und als solches in einer Reihe steht mit allen übrigen Tempora."⁸ Tobler should be quoted, even if he is less explicit in his statement:

"Wie nun aber wenn . . . das Geschehen oder Sein, von welchem aus ein Zweites als bevorstehend hingestellt werden soll, durch Perfektum oder Imperfektum ausgedrückt ist? Naturgemäss wird dann statt des Futurum Praesentis das Futurum Praeteriti, der sogenannte Konditionalis eintreten. In der Tat ist

¹ *Grammaire des Grammaires*, 1840.

² "Die Verschiebung lateinischer Tempora in den romanischen Sprachen," *Romanische Studien*, II, Heft 8 (1876), p. 257.

³ *Grammaire supérieure*, 1901.

⁴ *Grammaire comparée de la langue française* (1900), p. 242.

⁵ *Französische Sprache für den Schulgebrauch* (1889), p. 98.

⁶ *Französische Grammatik* (1885), p. 105.

⁷ *Revue de philologie française et provençale*, XI (1897), 274.

⁸ *Romanische Studien*, II, 257.

nichts häufiger als Beispiele dieser ursprünglichsten aller Verwendungen des Konditionalis. . . ."¹ And, p. 158: "so ist die Tempusform *je partirais*, 'ich hatte aufzubrechen' zur Modusform '*je partirais*' 'ich brähe auf' geworden." Whether it is safe to conclude that by *Tempusform* is meant a tense of the indicative, must be left to individual opinion.

Brunot,² on the contrary, can be quoted as distinctly accepting the indicative origin of this verb-entity. We find, p. 505: "Mais nous avons déjà vu, en parlant des formes du verbe, que la langue avait composé un nouveau temps pour marquer le futur dans le passé, et nous avons indiqué aussi en parlant de l'emploi de ce temps, qu'il avait surtout une valeur modale"; and farther on: "Il s'agirait premièrement d'expliquer comment un temps de l'indicatif a pu usurper la fonction qui appartenait à un temps du subjonctif."

Ayer, p. 477, goes a step farther than any of the foregoing: "Le conditionnel," he says, "appartient au mode indicatif, même lorsqu'il dépend d'une condition ou d'une supposition, car dans ce cas il marque également la réalité, soit la réalité supposée."

The evidence quoted above, while by no means complete, is very fairly representative, and it appears safe to deduce from it that the consensus of opinion: (1) ascribes to the verb-entity composed of infinitive plus imperfect of verb *avoir* a temporal force as quite distinct from its modal force (in hypothetical sentences, etc.); (2) assigns this tense to the indicative mood; (3) considers this temporal use the primitive and original, and the modal the derived use of our verb-entity, though some diverging views on this last point are not lacking. Chief among these should be quoted Diez's: "Au moyen de la même méthode on créa ensuite avec *habebam* un second temps qui pour le sens répond à peu près à l'imparfait du subjonctif latin."³

Very pertinent to the discussion of the temporal and modal nature of our verb-entity would be a consideration of the essence and genesis of mood-force in general, though reasons of space and the limitations set by the necessity for unity and congruity in a short

¹ *Vermischte Beiträge zur französischen Grammatik*, II, 140.

² *Précis de grammaire historique de la langue française*.

³ *Grammaire des langues romanes*, II, 109.

study allow only a brief survey of the question here, a more thorough-going consideration being reserved for some future occasion.

There is nothing new in the statement that mood and tense are not distinct and separate phenomena, but merely related phases of one basal whole. The relation between mood and tense was studied by Tobler¹ in an article which, in spite of the time which has elapsed since it was written, still remains of paramount importance. The entire article throws light on our subject, though only a few of the most salient remarks can be quoted here. Tobler says, p. 33:

Im ganzen wird man mit der Ansicht der Wahrheit ziemlich nahe kommen, dass keines von beiden, weder Tempus noch Modus, ursprünglich für sich ausgebildet war, ehe noch vom anderen eine Spur keimte, sondern dass entweder in einer dem Hebräischen² ähnlichen Weise beide in einander lagen und sich allmählich von einander lösten, oder dass zwar eines von beiden vorherrschte, aber schon sehr früh zu Zwecken des andern verwandt, wohl gar formell umgebildet wurde.

And, p. 34:

Die Ansicht, dass die Tempora (doch wohl das Präsens ausgenommen) aus ursprünglichen Modi erwachsen seien, kann sich am ehesten auf das Futurum stützen, welches auch, wo es in relativ einfacher Form vorhanden ist, d.h. nicht überhaupt fehlt oder gar umschrieben wird, als spätere Bildung, aus dem Conjunctiv und Optativ entnommen, zu erkennen giebt. Dass das Futurum von den Zeiten die abstracteste ist, also dem ältesten Bedürfniss und Vermögen am entferntesten lag, wurde oben gemerkt, ebenfalls angedeutet, dass der Begriff des möglichen, wofür Conjunctiv und Optativ gelten, leicht in den des zukünftigen übergehen.

Also, p. 35:

Trotzdem wäre es übereilt, was vom Futurum gilt, diesen modalen Ursprung, aufs Präteritum übertragen zu wollen, dessen uralte Formen nichts von solcher Abhängigkeit verraten. . . . Wohl findet hier das umgekehrte statt, *modale Verwendung des ursprünglichen Tempus*. Schon oben war davon die Rede, wie fern die Vergangenheit an Nichtwirklichkeit und blosser Möglichkeit gränze.

In spite of this undeniable interrelation, however, mood and tense are on the whole, to the modern Romance mind, pretty clearly differentiated; moreover, this differentiation seems to be one of the characteristics of the Indo-European languages. Even in Semitic

¹ "Übergang zwischen Tempus und Modus," *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, II (1862).

² Cf. quotation given farther on, p. 79.

languages¹ and more specifically in Hebrew, there still persists a very primitive lack of differentiation: Hebrew possesses only two verb-entities, which go respectively by the name of "first mood" or "perfect," and "second mood" or "imperfect":

Es sind also beides Haupttempora, aber weil ihnen zur genaueren Modifikation des Temporalen Neben-Tempora fehlen, schlagen sie, grade wegen dieser angeborenen Spröde zu blossen Rudimenta von Modi herab, denn wahre Modi (wie der daneben bestehende Imperativ und Infinitiv) können sie auch nicht wieder sein, weil diese deutlich ausgeprägte Tempora neben sich verlangen, um ganz rein ihrer Bestimmung zu dienen.

What then is this essential nature of mood as distinct from tense, this *Bestimmung*, this "function" which they are intended to perform? It is interesting to note the variety of the answers we get to this query. "Mood is the expression, through the form of the Verb, of certain *attitudes of mind* toward an act or state."² Since there is no limit to the possible "attitudes of mind," this definition allows theoretically of an unlimited number of moods, though the "attitudes of mind" specified are but four: attitude of commanding; attitude of wishing; attitude of fearing; attitude of recognizing a fact. However, the remark is added: "But many attitudes of mind can be expressed only by special words combined with an Infinitive, e.g., the attitude of hesitation, as in *dubito adesse*, I hesitate to be present." According to this definition, then, mood would be entirely subjective, depending altogether on the attitude of mind of the speaker and not at all on any inherent quality of the act or state expressed by the verb; there would also be no limit to the possible number of moods.

Very different is the opinion expressed by Brinkman:

Es liegt in der Natur der Sache, dass es nur drei Modusformen giebt, da eine Handlung nur unter den drei Gesichtspunkten der Wirklichkeit, der Möglichkeit, der Nothwendigkeit gedacht werden kann: den Indikativ, Conjunktiv und Imperativ. Das Griechische kennt zwar ausserdem einen Optativ, das ist aber nur eine besondere Art des Konjunktivs. Der Indikativ ist der Modus der Wirklichkeit, d.h. der Ausdruck für dasjenige, was der Redende als wirklich, als eine Thatsache auffasst. Der Konjunktiv ist der Modus der Vorstellung, d.h. der Ausdruck für dasjenige, was der

¹ See Tobler, *Übergang zwischen Tempus und Modus*, p. 31.

² Hale and Buck, *A Latin Grammar*, p. 239.

Redende nur als möglich, als eine blossе Vorstellung auffasst. Der Imperativ ist der Modus der Nothwendigkeit, d.h. der Ausdruck für dasjenige, was der Redende für notwendig hält, und als seinen Willen, seinen Befehl einer anderen Person ausspricht. Es liegt hierin schon ausgesprochen, verdient aber noch hervorgehoben zu werden, dass die Modusformen einen *durchaus subjektiven* Charakter haben. Sie drücken daher nie etwas Objektives aus, d.h. sie zeigen niemals an wie eine Thätigkeitsäusserung in der Wirklichkeit beschaffen sei. . . .¹

According to Brinkman mood would be entirely subjective, but the number of moods limited.

Gille says, or rather quotes from Steinthal:²

Die Sprache ist die Erscheinung des Gedankens. Durch die Modi hat der Redende die Mittel in der Hand, die Beschaffenheit dieses Gedankens zu kennzeichnen. Um die Uebereinstimmung dieses Gedankens mit der Welt des ausser ihm bestehenden zu betonen, benutzt der Redende den Indikativ. Will er aber betonen, dass sein Gedanke wesentlich nur Gedanke ist, gleichviel ob er reales Fundament hat oder nicht, so gebraucht er den Konjunktiv. Darum steht dieser Modus hauptsächlich zum Ausdruck des Wunsches und der Ungewissheit, nach welchen Kategorien wir ihn behandeln.³

According to this definition the essence of mood would be the discrimination between *reality* and *thought*, and theoretically only two moods would exist.

Mr. Brunot in his discussion of mood says:

Des Modes. Ce sont les modifications subies suivant les rapports de la chose énoncée avec les vues de l'esprit ou les affections de l'âme de celui qui parle.⁴

And, p. 436:

Suivant les uns, et c'est là la vieille doctrine de l'orient, nous concevons tout comme réel ou comme possible. Suivant les autres, nous voyons les choses par intuition, par réflexion, ou comme des objets de notre activité. De là, dit-on, trois modes: l'indicatif, le subjonctif, l'impératif.

But, Mr. Brunot continues, the development and present complexity of French moods is such, "que la théorie s'en trouve démentie à chaque instant," and he consequently prefers to consider moods and their uses in the old traditional order.

¹ *Syntax des Französischen und Englischen* (1885), p. 782.

² Gill, "Der Konjunktiv im Französischen," *Herrig's Archiv*, LXXXII (1889), 426.

³ *Grammatik, Logik und Psychologie*, p. 385.

⁴ *Précis de grammaire historique de la langue française*, p. 384.

Even the traditional order is far, however, from eliminating complexity and contradiction; though its practical insufficiency is undoubtedly far more obvious to those who concern themselves with the teaching of French to foreigners, than to anyone who is studying French moods and tenses with native students, since the latter can rely on their *Sprachgefühl* for a practical knowledge of moods which will lead them safely around many a slough in which the foreigner flounders. It is not surprising, therefore, that attempts are not lacking to replace the traditional presentation of moods by something clearer and better.

Prominent among such attempts is the article by This¹ whose interesting conclusions are summarized here. If I have understood him, he tacitly assumes that mood is subjective and depends on some quality of the thought of the speaker, e.g. (p. 236), hearing a noise in the next room, we say: "Es ist jemand im Nebenzimmer wenn auch dieser Redehalt der Wirklichkeit nicht entspricht: wir stellen das gesagte als wahrgenommen hin, es ist als *wahrgenommen* gedacht ausgesprochen." Some exception could be taken to this example, for it appears to be a case of "substitution of mood" rather than a normal use of the indicative. A careful speaker would rather say under those circumstances: "Es muss jemand im Nebenzimmer sein," "There must be someone in the next room," "Il doit y avoir quelqu'un dans la chambre à côté," and less frequently in French, perhaps, than in Italian "il y aura"; "Ci sarà, ci deve essere, gente nella stanza accanto." But, p. 237, if we see heavy clouds we say: "Es wird regnen." "Wir sagen nicht 'es regnet' weil das Geschehen nicht wahrgenommen ist. Das 'Regnen-werden' ist gefolgert, ist potential: die Aussage 'Es wird regnen' ist durch die Wahrnehmung des bewölkten Himmels u.s.w. bedingt." And, p. 238: "mit allen futurischen Sätzen wird demnach ein Geschehen als (durch ein oder mehrere als wahrgenommen gedachte Geschehen) bedingt gedacht hingestellt." It is undoubtedly true that all futurity implies an element of "condition," but this "condition" does not always so much depend on "wahrgenommen gedachtes Geschehen" as on unforeseen and unforeseeable contingencies. This is very obviously the case in examples like: "Tomorrow the sun will set at six-fifteen,"

¹ *Zur Lehre der Tempora und Modi im Französischen.* Gröber Festschrift.

in which the realization of the statement is confidently expected unless meanwhile the world comes to an end, which cannot be considered "ein wahrgenommen gedachtes Geschehen." The difference between mere futurity and conditioned statement comes out very clearly by the comparison of two sentences like: "If I earn enough, I shall pay you what I owe you," and "I have the money in the bank, and tomorrow I shall pay you what I owe you."

On p. 239 This says that verb-forms like *vienne, soit, parle* "drücken demnach einen Redehalt aus der *nicht* als wahrgenommen, nicht als bedingt gesetzt wird, also Gegensatz zu dem als wahrgenommen oder bedingt gedachten sein oder Geschehen. . . . Bei solcher Bezeichnung der Thätigkeit wird also ein Satzinhalt als nur *vorgestellt* ausgesprochen."

For the present time-sphere This recognizes, therefore, four possible moods that denote the action or state expressed by the verb as (1) *wahrgenommen*—"il écrit"; (2) *bedingt*—"il écrira"; (3) *nur vorgestellt*—"(*je désire, il est temps, il est possible*) qu'il écrive": (4) *als befohlen*—"écris."

For the past time-sphere there is no imperative; but (p. 249) This finds it necessary to create another mood, to which he has given no place in his mood-scheme: "Die Thätigkeitsformen, vermittelt deren ein Sein oder Geschehen für die Zeitstufe der Vergangenheit als vollgeführt bezeichnet wird, wollen wir Modus narrativus, kurzweg Narrativ bezeichnen."

Another article that claims consideration is Sechehaye's "L'imparfait du subjonctif et ses concurrents dans les hypothétiques normales en français."¹ The strict limitation of his subject excludes a complete discussion or even a categorical definition of mood, which appears, however, to be promised for some future time. The gleanings on this subject are nevertheless of interest, especially the following statement, p. 324: "Pour la désignation des modes nous avons fait une innovation importante en créant le terme *fictionnel* pour désigner à la fois les modes logiques potentiel et irréel." Farther on we find the expression, "mode logique *réel* ou *objectif*," and it may not be too risky to conclude that the "mode *fictionnel*" is considered *subjective*.

¹ *Romanische Forschungen*, XIX (1906).

If from the foregoing survey we try to sum up the trend of thought, "the attitude of mind," of present-day scholarship with regard to *mood*, I think that we can safely say that the "subjectivity" of mood is pretty generally accepted; also, that all seem to be agreed on the existence of one mood, the indicative, denoting that which the speaker wishes to convey as a "reality," as something that is perceived, *wahrgenommen* (This), *r  el ou objectif* (Sechehaye), etc.

Over against this one generally accepted mood-force are placed other mood-forces on whose definition and scope views vary considerably; as extremes one might compare the unlimited "attitudes of mind" (Hale-Buck), and the strictly limited three moods (Brinkman), two moods (Gille). But one more mood-force is either tacitly admitted or explicitly defined by almost all: the mood of *pure thought*: *Vorstellung* (Brinkman, This); *wesentlich nur Gedanke* (Gille); "something conceived in the mind of the speaker" (Armstrong); *fictionnel* (Sechehaye), etc. But a closer analysis shows that even Brinkman's third mood-force "the imperative," is after all only *Vorstellung*, and the same remark also applies to This's *Konditional* and *Imperatif*, etc. Restricting ourselves, for a minute, to French, it is safe to say that on the whole, with some restrictions and divergencies, the opinion prevails that the principal, if not the only, function of mood is to discriminate between *fact* and *thought*, between *perception* (*Wahrnehmung*) and *conception* (*Vorstellung*).

But if Tobler's suggestion with regard to future tense-force, i.e., that its "abstractness" militates against the primitiveness of its origin (cf. quotation given above, *ibid.*, p. 33), can be accepted as valid even with regard to mood-force (and it is right in line with the generally accepted philological "postulate" that the formation of language is a process of "evolution"), then there is the strongest possible presumption that this modern principal function of mood in French was not the original one; for the original function of mood must, in all likelihood, have had a more practical nature.

The historical evidence, without which all theory is idle, seems to be all in favor of this assumption, since expressions of wish, will, and commanding, the first to be differentiated by special moods from other statements,¹ were practical necessities of common occurrence.

¹ Cf. Brugmann, *Kurze vergleichende Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*, p. 578; and Hale-Buck, *A Latin Grammar*, p. 29.

Since expressions of will and wish bred true to type throughout the ages, and are even in Romance languages the least subject to fluctuation of mood, the question of the existence of an older, primitive mood-force, and of its possible survival in modern French, is of some importance for the teaching of moods; but it cannot be discussed here. It is enough to hold fast to the generally accepted fact, that "statement of thought" is an essential function of the subjunctive, while "statement of fact" is, on the whole, the characteristic function of the indicative, and to remember that future and past-future express "thought" (conception), not "fact" (perception), and are thus non-indicative by their nature, a view which is borne out by the very origin of Latin futures.

Lindsay says:

For verbs of the third and fourth Conjugations in Latin the I Sg. of the A-Subjunctive (see par. 55) is used for the I Sg. Future. . . . For the other Persons of the Future the E-subjunctive forms (see par. 55) are used. . . .¹

And, p. 492:

This *-bo* of the future tense . . . is clearly some part of the verb *bheu* (Lat. *fui*, etc.) of which we have seen *-bam* of the Imperfect tense to be a preterite. The future of Latin *sum*, *ero*, is a Subjunctive form, **es-o* with Future meaning: a meaning which seems to have attached itself to the I-Eur. Subjunctive (see par. 55).²

Logically, "futurity" did not change its nature when the old Latin futures were superseded in the Romance languages by the new formations which now go by the name of future and past future (or conditional). Now, if the "constructive," the "logical" indicative always expresses a fact, a reality, a *Wahrnehmung*, since futurity never expresses any of these things, there never was a reason to assign a future or past future tense to the indicative mood; indeed, since these two tenses strictly express a "concept" (not a percept), a logically indicative future and past future are nonsensical—an absurdity: their assumption would be justifiable only for formal or historical reasons, that is to say, if by chance, futurity, in spite of its "ideality," had originally been expressed, as certain conditions are, by a "formally" indicative tense. But this is not the case even with the new

¹ *The Latin Language*, chap. viii, p. 492.

² Cf. also Brugmann, *Kurze vergleichende Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*, pars. 747, 754, 763, etc.; Tobler, *Übergang zwischen Tempus und Modus*, p. 34.

Romance formations. Diez came very near the truth in considering the past future, "à peu près," an imperfect subjunctive,¹ and even those writers who explicitly state that it is a tense of the indicative take more or less cognizance of the fact that the infinitive plus the verb *avoir* implied from the first a notion of obligation, necessity. My contention is that even if the origin of the past future had been purely temporal, expressing mere futurity, it still would not have been an indicative tense; but I have serious doubts whether originally these expressions regularly expressed "futurity"; in other words, whether even as futures to both present and past, they have not suffered a shift in temporal value.

There is no reason for us to believe that originally these new formations differed in meaning from similar expressions in which even today the verb "to have" is used with the force of a modal auxiliary. Taking a modern Italian example, when Malatestino² answers Francesca's inquiry: "Senti dolore?" by saying "Sassate di saccardi ghibellini non *hanno da dolere*," the implication is not, "they shall not hurt" (in future time), but "they must not hurt," even at the moment of speaking, and, therefore, he feels no pain.

Just so in English we can say: "I have to lie in bed," "I have to stay at home," when the speaker is actually lying in bed, or staying in the house.

Nor has the future quite lost this original modal and temporal force: it still retains it in certain imperative expressions: "Dieu en vain ne jureras" implies obligation at the moment of speaking as well as for future time. Such also is the temporal value of the future in expressions of probability or supposition: "La nef appartient au XII^e siècle, mais le chœur sera du XV^e,"³ which in Italian could be rendered "sarà," but also "ha da essere del quattrocento." This should also be the temporal value of the future in what Robert calls "une nécessité logique":⁴ "Si deux plans sont parallèles, toute droite perpendiculaire à l'une sera perpendiculaire à l'autre"—"has to be," not "to become."

¹ Cf. reference given, p. 77, and previous exposition.

² D'Annunzio, *Francesca da Rimini*, Act II, scene v.

³ Fraser and Squair, p. 185.

⁴ *Questions de grammaire*, p. 178.

On the whole, however, it is safe to say that both verb-entities have specialized the function of expressing futurity with regard to a standpoint in present or past time, and this temporal force must have been original with all perfective verbs (e.g., "he had to come," *aveva da venire*) in which the *Aktionsart* implied futurity by its very nature.

But the modal uses of the past future (and it appears to have more than are generally recognized in French grammars, but I hope to come back to this point at some later time) should all be considered as derived from its original modal rather than from the secondary temporal force.

The indicative has no claim to the past future even as a tense. Dr. This, in the article already quoted, had excellent reasons for separating the future and past future tenses from the other tenses of the indicative, though the name he chose for the new tense, *Konditional*, is not felicitous. Lücking (and others) took a step in the right direction when he divided indicative tenses into "real" and "ideal," though "ideal" and "indicative" are really mutually exclusive terms, and an "ideal indicative tense" is a logical absurdity.

There is no logical reason why these tenses should not be assigned to the subjunctive mood in French: but if the tradition of centuries makes it too hard to disconnect entirely the future from the indicative mood, would it not be possible at least to compromise by considering future and past future as a distinct mood, a kind of a "link-mood" between indicative and subjunctive, and so to define them, even in elementary teaching?

The gain in clarity and precision in the statement of the rules for the use of the different moods would certainly make it worth while.

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